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hen a sexual 
assault occurs, 
it is usually 
committed in 
private. Only 
the victim and 
the attacker (or 
the attacker's 
cohorts) are 
present. The 
same can be said of consensual sexual ac-
tivity (between persons old enough un-
der the law to be considered capable of 
consenting). Thus, when an adult alleges 
that he or she has been sexually assault-
ed, and the accused person raises the de-
fense of consent, the trial often comes 
down to a contest of "He said" vs. "She 
said." See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Prior Sim-
ilar Acts in Prosecutions for Rape and Child 
Sex Abuse, 4 Crim. L.F. 307, 316-17 (1993); 
David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Oth-
er Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 
Minn. L. Rev. 529, 578 (1994). 
The 1991 rape trial of William Kennedy 
Smith is an infamous example. She (the 
alleged victim) said that she met Smith at 
a bar, danced with him, and went with 
him to the Kennedy compound for a walk 
on the beach, when he suddenly took off 
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his pants, threw her down, and raped her. 
He (Smith) said that she consented to in-
tercourse, but became angry when he 
called her the wrong name. Other accu-
sations and insinuations later emerged as 
to her possibly stealing something from 
the house, her having had a child out of 
wedlock, and her father's having had 
some sort of rivalry with and animosity 
to the Kennedys. 
Given this state of the evidence, the 
jury, instructed that the state of Florida 
had the burden of proving guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, would be hard 
pressed to return anything but a "not 
guilty" verdict. (United States jurisdic-
tions do not, like Scotland, offer the jury 
the option of a verdict of "not proven.") 
According to press reports, there were 
three other women who came forward 
and were willing to testify that Smith had 
engaged in conduct with them similar to 
that alleged by the victim. See Beale, supra 
at 308 & nn.3-4; Bryden & Park, supra at 
530 & nn.5-8. Had the jury seen these wit-
nesses and found them credible, it might 
well have credited the victim's testimony, 
rather than Smith's, and returned a guilty 
verdict. Of course, if Smith were guilty, 
this would have been the just course. Yet 
the trial court excluded the other women's 
testimony, under the well-known "pro-
pensity rule." See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). 
Smith was acquitted. 
When more people independently tell 
similar stories, each account strengthens 
the credibility of the other. Cf the recent 
report of the Senate Ethics Committee, con-
cluding that there was "substantial cred-
ible evidence that [Sen. Packwood] 
engaged in a pattern of sexual miscon-
duct," including acts on eight specific oc-
casions between 1969 and 1990. See Bryden 
& Park, supra at 561 ("More speculatively, 
one may surmise that exclusion of prior 
crimes evidence undermines the legiti-
macy and acceptability of acquittals in 
some criminal cases.") (footnote omitted). 
Courts in some states probably would 
have admitted the evidence proffered 
against Smith, under a special exception 
to the propensity rule in sexual offense 
cases. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra at 
557-59; Lynn McLain, Maryland Evi-
dence: State and Federal §404.1, at 344 
& n.27 (1987 & Supp. 1994). Other courts 
might have admitted the evidence in the 
Ms. Mcl.llin is a professor with the 
University of Baltimore School of Lnw. 
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Smith case, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) or 
its equivalent, as showing an intent to 
have sex regardless of the victim's will. 
But admission under 404(b) is at best an 
iffy proposition. See Beale, supra at 309-
13; Bryden & Park, supra at 530-60; David 
J. Kaloyanides, The Depraved Sexual In-
stinct Theory: An Example of the Propensity 
for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of 
Evidence404(b), 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1297 
(1992). In any event, admission under 
404(b) historically results in "huge quan-
tities of appellate litigation" as to the cor-
rectness of that call. Bryden & Park, supra 
at 561 & n.l42. 
Congressional Action 
Earlier in 1991, Congress had before 
it a Bush administration proposal, intro-
duced by Senators Dole and Thurmond 
as part of the proposed Comprehensive 
Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, to lib-
eralize the rules of evidence to more freely 
permit evidence of other sexual miscon-
duct by the accused offender, in both civil 
and criminal cases alleging either sexual 
assault or child molestation (of a person 
under the age of 14 years). Beale, supra at 
307,313; 137 Congo Rec. 3192 (daily ed. 
Mar. 13, 1991). 
The supporting analysis explained that 
such evidence 
could be considered as evidence that 
the defendant has the motivation or 
disposition to commit sexual assaults, 
and a lack of effective inhibitions 
against acting on such impulses, and 
as evidence bearing on the probabil-
ity or improbability that the defen-
dant was falsely implicated in the 
offense of which he is presently 
accused. 
137 Congo Rec. at §3239 (quoted in Beale, 
supra at 314). In child molestation cases, 
the analysis stated that "[e]vidence of 
other acts of molestation indicates that the 
defendant has a type of desire or impulse 
- a sexual or sexual-sado interest in young 
children - that simply does not exist in 
normal people." Id. at §3240 (quoted in 
Beale, supra at 319). 
In urging the bill's adoption, Senator 
Dole stated, "[W]hen someone is out there 
committing sex crime after sex crime .. .it 
is this Senator's view that this evidence 
should be admitted at trial, without a pro-
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 
tracted struggle over whether the evi-
dence has been properly admitted under 
rule 404(b) or some other exception./I 139 
Congo Rec. §15137, §15138 (daily ed. Nov. 
5,1993). 
This proposal eventually passed as part 
of the comprehensive crime bill of 1994. 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, Title 
XXXII, §320935(a) (Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 
2135). See James Joseph Duane, The New 
Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Ac-
cused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Ver-
sion ofa Very Bad Idea, 157F.R.D. 95,96-97 
(1994) (recounting importance of Rep. 
Susan Molinari (R, N.Y.)'s role). In that 
bill, Congress tentatively approved the 
adoption of three new Rules (designated 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415) under 
which such evidence of other sexual of-
fenses generally would be admissible. 
Under the terms of the bill as enacted, 
the Judicial Conference of the United 
States was required to evaluate the pro-
posed Rules and to send its recommen-
dations on them to Congress within 150 
days after the enactment of the crime bill. 
The Judicial Conference forwarded its 
comments and proposed changes to Con-
gress on the 149th day, February 9,1995. 
Congress' original proposals nonethe-
less would become effective 150 days after 
the transmittal by the Judicial Conference, 
unless" otherwise provided by law," i.e., 
unless Congress took other action. Pub. 
L. 103-322, §320935(b)-(d). Because Con-
gress took no further action, its original 
proposals became effective July 9,1995. 
The primary effect of Congress' action 
would seem to be in its potential influ-
ence on the states. The vast majority of 
sexual offense cases are tried in state 
courts. The federal cases arise most fre-
quently from assaults or child molesta-
tion on military bases and American 
Indian reservations. But at least 38 states, 
including Maryland, have adopted evi-
dence codes based on the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, and any changes in the Fed-
eral Rules surely will be evaluated as 
models for the states, and possibly adopt-
edbythem. 
The Rules Adopted by Congress 
New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-
415, set forth in the 1994 Comprehensive 
Crime Bill, and which took effect July 9, 
1995, read as follows: 
Rule 413, Evidence of Similar 
Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases 
(a) In a criminal case in which the 
defendant is accused of an offense of 
sexual assault, evidence of the de-
fendant's commission of another of-
fense or offenses of sexual assault is 
admissible, and may be considered 
for its bearing on any matter to which 
it is relevant. 
(b) In a case in which the Govern-
ment intends to offer evidence under 
this rule, the attorney for the Gov-
ernment shall disclose the evidence 
to the defendant, including state-
ments of witnesses or a summary of 
the substance of any testimony that 
is expected to be offered, at least fif-
teen days before the scheduled date 
of trial or at such later time as the 
court may allow for good cause. 
(c) This rule shall not be construed 
to limit the admission or considera-
tion of evidence under any other rule. 
(d) For purposes of this rule and 
Rule 415, "offense of sexual assault" 
means a crime under Federal law or 
the law of a State (as defined in sec-
tion 513 of title 18, United States 
Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by 
chapter l09A of title 18, United States 
Code. 
(2) contact, without consent, be-
tween any part of the defendant's 
body or an object and the genitals or 
anus of another person; 
(3) contact, without consent, be-
tween the genitals or anus of the de-
fendant and any part of another 
person's body; 
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or 
gratification from the infliction of 
death, bodily injury, or physical pain 
on another person; or 
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to en-
gage in conduct described in para-
graphs (1)-(4). 
Rule 414. Evidence of Similar 
Crimes in Child Molestation 
Cases 
(a) In a criminal case in which the 
defendant is accused of an offense of 
child molestation, evidence of the de-
fendant's commission of another of-
35 
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fense or offenses of child molestation 
is admissible, and may be considered 
for its bearing on any matter to 
which it is relevant. 
(b) In a case in which the Govern-
ment intends to offer evidence un-
der this rule, the attorney for the 
Government shall disclose the evi-
dence to the defendant, including 
statements of witnesses or a sum-
mary of the substance of any testi-
mony that is expected to be offered, 
at least fifteen days before the sched-
uled date of trial or at such later time 
as the court may allow for good 
cause. 
(c) This rule shall not be construed 
to limit the admission or considera-
tion of evidence under any other 
rule. 
(d) For purposes of this rule and 
Rule 415, "child" means a person be-
low the age of fourteen, and "offense 
of child molestation" means a crime 
under Federal law or the law of a 
State (as defined in section 513 of ti-
tle 18, United States Code) that in-
volved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by 
chapter l09A of title 18, United States 
Code, that was committed in relation 
to a child; 
(2) any conduct proscribed by 
chapter 110 of title 18, United States 
Code; 
(3) contact between any part of the 
defendant's body or an object and 
the genitals or anus of a child; 
(4) contact between the genitals or 
anus of the defendant and any part 
of the body of a child; 
(5) deriving sexual pleasure or 
gratification from the infliction of 
death, bodily injury, or physical pain 
on a child; or 
(6) an attempt or conspiracy to en-
gage in conduct described in para-
graphs (1)-(5). 
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts 
in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual 
Assault or Child Molestation 
(a) In a civil case in which a claim 
for damages or other relief is predi-
cated on a party's alleged commis-
sion of conduct constituting an 
offense of sexual assault or child mo-
lestation, evidence of that party's 
commission of another offense or of-
fenses of sexual assault or child mo-
lestation is admissible and may be 
considered as provided in Rule 413 
and Rule 414 of these rules. 
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(b) A party who intends to offer 
evidence under this Rule shall dis-
close the evidence to the party against 
whom it will be offered, including 
statements of witnesses or a sum-
mary of the substance of any testi-
mony that is expected to be offered, 
at least fifteen days before the sched-
uled date of trial or at such later time 
as the court may allow for good 
cause. 
(c) This rule shall not be construed 
to limit the admission or considera-
tion of evidence under any other rule. 
Questions Raised by the New Rules 
Opponents of the policy decision re-
flected in the new Rules generally echo 
the traditional arguments supporting the 
"propensity rule" of exclusion of charac-
ter evidence to prove guilt: (1) lack of pro-
bative value; (2) risk of the jury's 
attributing too much weight to the evi-
dence of other wrongs, or of punishing 
the alleged offender for those wrongs; and 
(3) judicial economy. See Duane, supra at 
107-11 (opposing the Rules' liberalization 
of admissibility altogether as creating "a 
terrible risk of unfair prejudice to inno-
cent defendants with a criminal history"). 
We traditionally have chosen not to have 
trials within trials, about other, uncharged 
acts. See Bryden & Park, supra at 565. 
But the propensity rule is peculiarly 
Anglo-American. See Bryden & Park, 
supra at 529 & n.3; 1 Wigmore on Evi-
dence §8C at 638 (rev. 1983); lA id. §54.l; 
1 id. §193 at 644-46 (3d ed. 1940). And a 
number of American scholars have crit-
icized it. Beale, supra at 314 & n.23. See also 
Bryden & Park, supra note I, at 561-65 
(liOn the whole, personality theory prob-
ably lends some support to the idea that 
character evidence is more prejudicial 
than informative. The research, howev-
er, has not achieved the level of accep-
tance that one sees, for example, in 
eyewitness testimony research. In addi-
tion, its applicability to legal issues is 
sometimes questionable. "). 
After all, "behavior science research ... 
shows that, by and large, the best way to 
predict anybody's behavior is his behav-
ior in the past ... II Paul E. Meehl, Law and 
the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript): Some 
Riflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 7 Be-
havioral Sci. & L. 521,532 (1989) (quoted 
in Bryden & Park, supra at 529. Under the 
proposed Rules, only evidence of similar 
acts would be admissible as substantive 
proof. (The door would not be opened to 
proof of dissimilar acts showing bad 
moral character, e.g., failure to file income 
tax, arson, theft). 
The law already finds this "other sim-
ilar acts" evidence relevant and admissi-
ble in a negligent hiring or retention case. 
When, for example, a church is sued for 
transferring a priest to a new parish and 
keeping him in a position where he could 
molest young boys, the fact that the 
church had previously had complaints of 
similar assaults by the priest in his former 
parish is admissible to show the church's 
negligence. In the author's opinion, this 
squares with common sense. 
We find the same kind of recognition 
by potential jurors of the probative value 
of a person's past acts when,let us sup-
pose, another young woman alleges that 
she met Smith recently and, after going 
to the movies with him, invited him into 
her apartment for coffee, when he vio-
lently assaulted her. Is there any doubt 
that many observers would say, "She 
should have known better than to trust 
him. What was she thinking?" 
Several leading commentators have 
concluded that"a strong case has been 
The ONLY Lawyer's Professional Liability Insurance Company 
Endorsed by the Maryland State Bar Association 
I FGAI.. NIIIUAL 
Liability Insurance 
Society of Maryland 
Contact and direct telephone for: 
301-421-0212 
Fax 301-421-1479 
In Maryland: 
800-638-8947 
Fax 800-287-6800 
Marketing and Seminars - Kay G. Kenny, Assistant General Manager . .......... 301-421-0997 
Underwriting - James P. Kreider, CPCU - Underwriting Manager . .............. 301-421-1439 
Claims - Mary C. Nevius, Esquire - Senior Claims Counsel. ................... 301-421-1136 
Angela C. LaRosa, Esquire - Claims Counsel . .......................... 301-421-1422 
Administration - Walter E. Stewart, Jr. General Manager . ..................... 301-421-0229 
Amy L. Houghton, Office Administrator . .............................. 301-421-0212 
3905 National Drive., Suite 430 
Burtonsville Office Park, Building III 
Burtonsville, MD 20866 - 1100 
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 37 
made for the more generous admission 
of prior uncharged misconduct in rape 
and child sex abuse cases, particularly in 
cases of acquaintance rape," i.e., rape cas-
es where the defense is consent. Sara Sun 
Beale, Prior Similar Acts in Prosecutions for 
Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 12 Duke L. Mag-
azine 4-9 (Summer 1994). See Bryden & 
Park, supra at 573-83 (differentiating "ac-
quaintance rape," consent defense cases 
from "stranger rape," mistaken identity 
defense cases). As to "stranger rape," 
where the defense is an alibi, these com-
mentators conclude that Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b) is adequate, in that it permits evi-
dence of other crimes to prove "identity," 
only when there is a distinctive modus 
operandi. 
There are due process concerns, as well. 
If the other events allegedly happened 
long ago, can the defendant be expected 
to adequately defend against them? (Cf 
the repressed memory / statute of limita-
tions debate). If the defendant has not 
been tried for the other acts, he or she can 
take the Fifth Amendment as to them (as 
Patty Hearst did, without much appar-
ent success). 
How long would hearing the evidence 
on these matters take? Of how much help 
will it likely be to the jury in properly re-
solving the issue before it? These are the 
kinds of considerations that a judge ought 
to evaluate in making a determination 
whether to exclude 413-415 type evidence 
under Fed. R. Evid. 403. (Note also that 
the same questions must be asked by a 
court applying Rule 404(b), which also 
does not restrict the time frame in which 
other admissible acts must have been 
committed.) 
But the proposed Rules' use of the 
phrase "is admissible" creates confusion. 
Whether the Rules as proposed by Con-
gress would permit a court to exclude oth-
er sex crimes evidence, in the exercise of 
its discretion under Rule 403, is unclear. 
In other contexts, the "is admissible" 
phrase is used to mandate admissibility 
of evidence on a particular subject, al-
though the manner of proof (e.g., by a wit-
ness with first-hand knowledge), remains 
governed by other rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 
410, 608(a). Cf Fed. R. Evid. 612 (adverse 
party "is entitled ... to introduce in evi-
dence"); 705 (expert "may testify" -
clearly subject to requirements of Rule 
702, however). Rule 609(a)(1), however, 
another Rule drafted by Congress rather 
than the Supreme Court's advisory com-
mittee, uses the phrase "shall be admit-
ted." This is in contrast with 609(a)(1), 
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which uses the phrase "shall be admitted, 
subject to Rule 403." 
The statement in the section-by-section 
analysis of the 1991 bill that "the proba-
tive value of such evidence is strong, and 
is not outweighed by any overriding risk 
of prejudice" also supports the argument 
that Rule 403 is inapplicable. 137 Congo 
Rec. §3214, §324O (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). 
But statements made on the floor by some 
of the bill's sponsors support the contrary 
conclusion, i.e., that evidence offered un-
der Rules 413-415 would be subject to ex-
clusion in the court's discretion under 
Rule 403. Bryden & Park, supra at 566 & 
n.l68; Duane, supra at 102-03. 
Because Congress did not change the 
language of the Rules, a court would have 
to resort either to this legislative history 
to permit application of Rule 403 (which 
at least Justice Scalia would be loath to 
do) or to Rule 402 to exclude completely 
irrelevant evidence. After all, the pro-
posed Rules permit consideration by the 
jury only "on any matter as to which [the 
evidence of other acts] is relevant." 
The argument has also been made that, 
absent amendment, the new Rules would 
permit use of opinion and reputation ev-
idence, as well as evidence of specific acts. 
See Duane, supra at 120-22. This result is 
unlikely. The Rules refer to "evidence of 
the defendant's commission of another of 
fense or offenses of sexual assault [or child 
molestation]." (emphasis added) Repu-
tation and opinion testimony are permit-
ted under Rule 405 only as to a pertinent 
character trait, not as to a specific act or of-
fense. Nonetheless, these kinds of ques-
tions could and should have been 
answered by Congress by clarifying the 
proposed Rules in response to the com-
ments received from the Judicial Confer-
ence. 
Response by the Judicial Conference 
The Judicial Conference of the United 
States referred Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence 413-415 to its Advisory Com-
mittee on Evidence Rules for its consid-
eration. After studying the proposed 
Rules, the Advisory Committee on Evi-
dence concluded that it opposed their 
adoption. 
The committee members "did not be-
lieve, however, that it was their role to 
prepare alternative rules that dilute the 
policies articulated by Congress." Letter 
from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, to author, December 2,1994. There-
fore, the committee merely drafted "al-
ternative amendments to Rules 404 and 
405 that would both correct ambiguities 
and possible constitutional infirmities 
identified in Rules 413-415 and remain 
consistent with congressional intent." Id. 
The committee's report was nearly 
unanimous; the one dissenting vote was 
that of the representative of the Depart-
ment of Justice. Report of the Judicial Con-
ference on the Admission of Character 
Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct 
Cases, February 9,1995, at 2 (sent with 
transmittal cover letter from L. Ralph 
Mecham to the Hon. Newt Gingrich, Feb-
ruary 9,1995) (hereinafter cited as "Judi-
cial Conference Report"). 
The Advisory Committee on Evidence 
Rules' report was submitted to the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure ("the Standing 
Committee"). The Standing Committee 
reviewed that report and considered, as 
well, the fact that the Advisory Commit-
tees on Criminal and Civil Rules also op-
posed Rules 413-415, on the grounds that 
"the new rules would permit the intro-
duction of unreliable but highly prejudi-
cial evidence and would complicate trials 
by causing mini-trials of other alleged 
wrongs." Id. at 3. Again, the representa-
tives of the Department of Justice to those 
Advisory Committees dissented. 
The same result held in the Standing 
Committee. Over the dissent of its repre-
sentative of the Department of Justice, the 
Standing Committee recommended that 
Congress "reconsider its decision on the 
policy questions embodied in new Evi-
dence Rules 413, 414, and 415." Id. If, how-
ever, Congress chose not to so reconsider, 
then the Standing Committee recom-
mended that Congress instead adopt the 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules' 
drafted amendments to Rules 404 and 
405.Id. The Judicial Conference concurred 
with the Standing Committee. Id. at 4. 
The only differences between the 
changes proposed in the Judicial Confer-
ence's report and those proposed by 
the Advisory Committee were minor 
changes of style. For example, the Advi-
sory Committee's proposal as to Fed. 
R. Evid. 404(a)(4) began with the depen-
dent clause; the Judicial Conference's pro-
posal began with the independent clause 
and moved the dependent clause to the 
end of the sentence in that subpart. 
See proposals by Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, 
attachment to letter from Peter G. 
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McCabe, supra. 
The report submitted by the Judicial 
Conference to Congress on February 9, 
1995, summarized as follows the changes 
from proposed Rules 413-415 that the al-
ternative draft would have made. The 
Committee's draft would: 
(1) expressly apply the other rules 
of evidence to evidence offered under 
the new rules [by adding the phrase, 
"if ... otherwise admissible under 
these rules" and making Rule 403 ex-
pressly applicable]; 
(2) expressly allow the party 
against whom such evidence is of-
fered to use similar evidence in re-
buttal [including evidence of a third 
person's prior sexual acts, offered to 
prove that that person, rather than 
the accused, committed the alleged 
act]; 
(3) expressly enumerate the factors 
to be weighed by a court in making 
its Rule 403 determination [proxim-
ity in time; similarity, frequency, and 
surrounding circumstances; relevant 
intervening events, such as extensive 
medical treatment of the accused; 
other relevant similarities or differ-
ences; and, under the Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 403, the 
"availability of the other means of 
proof," as well as those factors stat-
ed generally in Rule 403 itself]; 
(4) render the notice provisions 
consistent with the provisions in ex-
isting Rule 404 regarding criminal 
cases; 
(5) eliminate the special notice pro-
visions of Rules 413-415 in civil cas-
es to that notice will be required as 
provided in the Federal Rules of Civ-
il Procedure [according to the usual 
time table for disclosure and discov-
ery]; and 
(6) permit reputation or opinion 
[including expert testimony if other-
wise admissible] evidence [only] af-
ter such evidence is offered by the 
accused or defendant. 
Judicial Conference Report, supra at 3-4. 
This draft also would have included con-
duct committed outside the United States. 
The Committee's draft would have 
deleted Proposed Rules 413-415 and in-
stead have added a Fed. R Evid. 404(a)(4), 
amended 404(b) and 405(a), and added a 
405(c), as indicated below: 
Rule 404. Character Evidence Not 
Admissible To Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions Other Crimes 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. 
MARYlAND BAR JOURNAL 
Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for 
the purpose of proving action in con-
formity therewith on a particular oc-
casion, except: 
***** 
(4) Character in sexual miscon-
duct cases. Evidence of another act 
of sexual assault or child molestation, 
or evidence to rebut such proof or an 
inference therefrom, if that evidence 
is otherwise admissible under these 
rules, in a criminal case in which the 
accused is charged with sexual as-
sault or child molestation, or in a civil 
case in which a claim is predicated 
on a party's alleged commission of 
sexual assault or child molestation. 
(A) In weighing the probative val-
ue of such evidence, the court may, 
as part of its rule 403 determination, 
consider: 
(i) proximity in time to the charged 
or predicate misconduct; 
(ii) similarity to the charged or 
predicate misconduct; 
(iii) frequency of the other acts; 
(iv) surrounding circumstances; 
(v) relevant intervening events; 
and 
(vi) other relevant similarities or 
differences. 
(B) In a criminal case in which the 
prosecution intends to offer evidence 
under this subdivision, it must dis-
close the evidence, including state-
ments of witnesses or a summary of 
the substance of any testimony, at a 
reasonable time in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown. 
(C) For purposes of this subdivi-
sion. 
(i) "sexual assault" means conduct 
- or an attempt or conspiracy to en-
gage in conduct - of the type pro-
scribed by charter 109A of title 18, 
United States Code, or conduct that 
involved deriving sexual pleasure or 
gratification from inflicting death, 
bodily injury, or physical pain on an-
other person irrespective of the age 
of the victim - regardless of whether 
that conduct would have subjected 
the actor to federal jurisdiction. 
(ii) "child molestation" means con-
duct - or an attempt or conspiracy to 
engage in conduct - of the type pro-
scribed by chapter 110 of title 18, 
United States Code, or conduct, com-
mitted in relation to a child below the 
age of 14 years, either of the type pro-
scribed by chapter 109A of title 18, 
United States Code, or that involved 
deriving sexual pleasure or gratifi-
cation from inflicting death, bodily 
injury, or physical pain on another 
person - regardless of whether that 
conduct would have subjected the 
actor to federal jurisdiction. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith except 
as provided in subdivision (a). It may, 
however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that 
upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance 
of trial, or during trial if the court ex-
cuses pretrial notice on good cause 
shown, of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce 
at trial. 
Rule 405. Methods Of Proving 
Character 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all 
cases in which evidence of character 
or a trait of character of a person is 
admissible, proof may be made by 
testimony as to reputation or by tes-
timony in the form of an opinion ex-
cept as provided in subdivision (c) of 
this rule. On cross-examination, in-
quiry is allowable into relevant spe-
cific instances of conduct. 
***** 
(c) Proof in sexual misconduct 
cases. In a case in which evidence is 
offered under rule 404(a)(4), proof 
may be made by specific instances of 
conduct, testimony as to reputation, 
or testimony in the form of an opin-
ion, except that the prosecution or 
claimant may offer reputation or 
opinion testimony only after the op-
posing party has offered such testi-
mony. 
Attachment to Judicial Conference Re-
port, supra. 
In each of its changes from Congress' 
proposals, the Committee draft was a sig-
nificant improvement. Although Con-
gress was bold enough to stay the course 
in terms of policy - as this writer hoped 
- it is unfortunate that it did not take the 
necessary action to accept the Commit-
tee's amendments. 
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